The German election contest may look like a predictable win for Angela Merkel on paper; however the post-election coalition talks look set to deliver high intensity political drama

The German social democrats (SPD) have a reputation for running an effective election campaign machine. Just take the legendary election canvasses in 2002 and 2005. Both times, the SPD were way behind the Christian Democrats (CDU), together with its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU), in the polls but spectacularly caught up in the final sprint.

There is now a real danger the SPD will lose this reputation when the German election takes place on 22 September. So far, the social democratic campaign has produced little more than negative headlines. It started with the all too sudden proclamation of Peer Steinbrück as frontrunner last year; apparently the former finance minister was unprepared for the task and lacked a clear strategy, never mind a team capable of delivering it. Ever since, his campaign has been littered with numerous gaffes and “misunderstandings.” Most recently, with the clock ticking, this has included the SPD moving to run a negative campaign against the highly popular Angela Merkel, which many PR-experts consider counterproductive. Steinbrück and party chairman Sigmar Gabriel have also confused voters by talking about possible tax cuts, leading to speculation of a manifesto U-turn: their platform puts stable finances at the forefront and includes higher taxes for the wealthy.

Considering this, it is hardly surprising that the campaign has not yet had much impact on the polls. For months now, the SPD has been trapped between 22 and 25 per cent. With the CDU/CSU staying around 40 per cent, the continuation of the “black-yellow” coalition with the unpopular liberal FDP is not unlikely.  

The self-absorption with internal dynamics and leadership hinders the SPD to do what is needed most right now – to polarise the electorate. In order to mobilise traditional voters and win back some of the 10 million voters the party lost since 1998 (a lot of whom slipped into the realm of non-voters), the SPD would have to connect the key campaign issues with both conflict-orientated and emotive politics. But Steinbrück has so far failed to do just that. Be it extending child care facilities, introducing a minimum wage, or capping housing rents – all his central claims have majority backing, plus there is a general discomfort with rising social inequalities in Germany. But the social democrats have not yet been able to turn these sentiments into party support.

Part of the problem is that Steinbrück is an economic expert running mainly on social issues. Instead of emphasising his core strengths – public finances and the economy, bank regulation and the fight against offshore havens –, he opted for a strategy of complementing his tough economic credentials with a social face. Thus, he gave his political (and journalistic) opponents the opportunity to denounce him as a former moderniser bound in chains by an SPD which has moved to the left. Steinbrück, so the storyline goes, is opportunistic and not credible. Currently, if it was a direct presidential style election, only 22 per cent would vote for Steinbrück, but 55 per cent for Merkel.

The desolate condition of the SPD is even more aggravating as the race is not over yet. A third of the voters are still undecided, and the polls before recent Länder elections have turned out to be inaccurate time and again, with regard to the smaller as well as the bigger parties.

Apart from that, the conservative engines of Angela Merkel’s coalition are not at all running smoothly. Quite the opposite: the government has been under pressure lately due to several scandals. The defence ministry paid half a billion Euros for a drone, even though it was clear from the beginning that the machine will not receive permission to fly, with the responsible minister claiming he had not been informed until recently. Moreover, the revelations by Edward Snowden about data surveillance led to a media outcry and put the coalition on the defensive.

Another weak spot is that the CDU/CSU is dried out in terms of ideas and direction. In order to demobilise opposition voters, Merkel implemented several policies originally proposed by the opposition, such as the energy transition. The triangulation, though, irritated large parts of her party. On the other hand, Merkel has done little to tackle Germany’s longer-term problems: an ageing society, a flawed (early) education system, a decaying public infrastructure, a tax system giving priority to marriage instead of children, and the low potential for growth in years to come. No wonder the conservative election manifesto is as unambitious as it is inconsistent: the text contains expensive promises for certain groups – more money for mothers, pensioners and families with children, as well as tax cuts – without wasting a word about ways to finance these measures.

How could Merkel cover up these flaws? Her unassuming manner and her diligence play a role, as well as the good (short-term) economic outlook and an increasingly hand-tame media. The main reason, however, has to do with the European crisis. Merkel, who is seen as protecting the German purse from the demands of other Eurozone countries, is successfully keeping away the controversial topic from the election campaign. Given the fact that the SPD supported almost all rescue measures in the Bundestag, the party has so far avoided the issue as well.

Now, all eyes are on the TV debate on September 1st, when eloquent Peer Steinbrück meets a rhetorically gauche chancellor. Two days later, the chancellor and her challenger will probably hold speeches in a special session of the Bundestag. These events may be Steinbrück´s last chance to change tack.

However, never has a single party received enough votes to form a government on its own. This is why the popularity and the likelihood of different coalition options are so important for electoral decisions. The grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD is the most popular constellation among all voters, followed by “red-green” and the incumbent conservative-liberal coalition. In order not to upset their respective political camps, the conservatives officially strive for continuing “black-yellow” and social democrats for “red-green”. Steinbrück has explicitly ruled out becoming a member of government in a grand coalition.

Sure enough, after September 22 things will be seen in a different light. Much will depend on whether the new Pirate party and the eurosceptic “Alternative für Deutschland” enter the parliament or not, and how many votes they grasp from their competitors. If neither political camp – CDU/CSU and FDP nor SPD and Green party – gets enough votes to form a coalition, Merkel would have to rely either on the SPD or the Greens in order to remain chancellor.

Since cooperation with the conservatives is very unpopular among members of both parties, there certainly will be discussions about a “red-red-green” coalition, consisting of SPD, the post-communist Left party and the Green party. This model would receive much headwind. Yet it would allow the SPD to wrench the chancellor´s office from the conservatives – and to disenchant a CDU without, then, Angela Merkel. So, even if the election race turns out to be rather unspectacular, we might witness some very exciting coalition talks in its aftermath.

Last weekend, the SPD threw a big party in front of Berlin´s Brandenburg Gate on the occasion of its 150th anniversary. 500, 000 supporters relished sausage, beer and live music. For a moment, the SPD felt like the mass movement it once was. “I have never seen anything like this in my life”, Peer Steinbrück said on stage.

But the glorious days are long gone. In reality, what is at stake on September 22 is whether the social democrats can stabilise their position as the strongest force in the left camp trading on the same competitive level as the conservatives – or whether the SPD further slides in the direction of a medium sized party.

Michael Miebach is a political scientist and senior editor of the Berliner Republik, a leading German political journal. He is also deputy chairman of the progressive think tank Das Progressive Zentrum.